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Abstract. We provide sufficient conditions to guarantee that a translation
based cipher is not vulnerable with respect to the partition-based trapdoor.
This trapdoor has been introduced, recently, by Bannier et al. (2016) and it
generalizes that introduced by Paterson in 1999. Moreover, we discuss the fact
that studying the group generated by the round functions of a block cipher may
not be sufficient to guarantee security against these trapdoors for the cipher.
1. Introduction. In the last years, since the work [11] of Coppersmith and Gross-
man, much attention has been devoted to the group generated by the round func-
tions of a block cipher. In this context, Paterson [17] showed that the imprimitivity
of the group can be exploited to construct a trapdoor. By a trapdoor we mean a hid-
den algebraic structure in the cipher design that would allow an attacker (with the
knowledge of the trapdoor) to break it easily. In [9] Caranti, Dalla Volta and Sala
introduced the definition of translation based cipher, which contains well-known
ciphers like AES [12], SERPENT [1] and PRESENT [8]. For this class of ciphers,
in [9] and [2], the authors provided cryptographic conditions on the S-Boxes and
the mixing layer, in order to guarantee the primitivity of the group generated by
the round functions of the cipher.
In a recent work [5], inspired by the partition cryptanalysis developed in [14], the
authors introduce the partition-based trapdoor. This type of trapdoor generalizes
that introduced by Paterson. Moreover, the authors give an example of a (toy) block
cipher which is not vulnerable with respect to linear [16] and differential attacks
[7], but that can be broken, easily, using the structure of the trapdoor. A more
sophisticated way to use such a weakness is given in [6].
The principal aim of this work is to investigate an open question left by Paterson
in his work [17], that is, if it might be possible to have the case where the round
functions generate a primitive group but the subgroup generated by the ℓ-round
cipher itself has a block structure. In particular, we want to find cryptographic
properties that could avoid such a threat.
In this work, we give some conditions on the S-boxes and the mixing layer of a
translation based cipher, in order to avoid the partition-based trapdoor. From this
result, we are able to give a security proof for the group of encryption functions of
a cipher with independent round-keys.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall some definitions and a
series of properties and already known results. In Section 3, we show how we can
avoid the partition-based trapdoor on a translation based cipher. Finally, in Section
4, we discuss the fact that studying the group generated by the round functions of
a block cipher may not be sufficient to guarantee security against these trapdoors
for the cipher, and we show that avoiding the partition-based trapdoor we can
give some properties of the group generated by an ℓ-round cipher with independent
round-keys. We report our conclusions and some final remarks in Section 5.
2. Preliminaries and notation. Let C be a block cipher acting on a message
space V = (F2)
d, for some d ≥ 1 (we suppose that V coincides with the ciphertext
space). Let K be its key space. Then any key k ∈ K individuates a permutation τk
on the space V and our cipher is given by the set
C = {τk | k ∈ K}.
We are interested in determining the properties of the group Γ(C) = 〈τk | k ∈ K〉.
Unfortunately, the study of Γ(C) is a difficult task, in general. Most modern block
ciphers are iterated ciphers, i.e., obtained by a composition of several key-dependent
permutations, called rounds. This allows to investigate an other permutation group
related to C. For an iterated block cipher C each τk is a composition of some
permutations of V , say τk,1, ..., τk,ℓ. For any round h, let
Γh(C) = 〈τk,h | k ∈ K〉,
therefore, we can define the group containing Γ(C) generated by the round functions
Γ∞(C) = 〈Γh(C) | h = 1, ..., ℓ〉.
2.1. Translation based ciphers. Here we consider translation based ciphers, in-
troduced in [9]. This class of iterated block ciphers includes some well-known ci-
phers, as for instance AES [12] and SERPENT [1].
We first fix the notation, in order to recall the definition of a translation based
cipher C. Let m, b > 1 and
V = V1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Vb,
where each Vi is isomorphic to (F2)
m. We will denote by Sym(V ) the symmetric
group on V . Given v ∈ V , we write σv ∈ Sym(V ) for the translation of V mapping
x to x + v. We denote by T (V ) the group of all translations of V . We will write
the action of g ∈ Sym(V ) on an element v ∈ V as vg.
For any v ∈ V , we will write v = v1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ vb, where vi ∈ Vi. Also, we consider
the projections πi : V → Vi mapping v 7→ vi.
Any γ ∈ Sym(V ) that acts as vγ = v1γ1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ vbγb, for some γi ∈ Sym(Vi), is
called bricklayer transformation (a “parallel map”) and any γi’s is a brick. Tradi-
tionally, the maps γi’s are called S-boxes and γ a “parallel S-box”. A linear map
λ : V → V is traditionally said a “Mixing Layer” when used in composition with
parallel maps. For any I ⊂ {1, ..., b}, with I 6= ∅ and I 6= {1, ..., b}, we define⊕
i∈I Vi a wall.
Definition 2.1. A linear map λ ∈ GL(V ) is called a proper mixing layer if no wall
is invariant under λ.
We can characterize translation-based block ciphers by the following:
Definition 2.2 ([9]). A block cipher C = {τk | k ∈ K} over F2 is called translation
based (tb) if:
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• it is the composition of a finite number of rounds, such that any round τk,h
can be written as γhλhσkh , where
- γh is a round-dependent bricklayer transformation (but it does not depend
on k) and 0γh = 0,
- λh is a round-dependent linear map (but it does not depend on k),
- kh is in V and depends on both k and the round (kh is called a “round
key”),
• for at least one round, called a “proper” round, we have (at the same time)
that λh is proper and that the map Φh : K → V given by k 7→ kh is surjective.
The assumption 0γh = 0 is not restrictive. Indeed, we can always include 0γh in
the round key addition of the previous round (see [9, Remark 3.3]).
Let m ≥ 1, and let f : (F2)m → (F2)m be a vectorial Boolean function. We
denote by fˆu(x) = f(x+u)+ f(x) the derivative of f in the direction of u ∈ (F2)m.
Definition 2.3. Let f be a vectorial Boolean function, for any a, b ∈ (F2)m we
define
δf (a, b) = |{x ∈ (F2)
m | fˆa(x) = b}|.
Then, f is said differentially δ-uniform if
δ = max
a,b∈(F2)
m,
a6=0
δf (a, b) .
Vectorial Boolean functions used as S-boxes in block ciphers must have low uni-
formity to prevent differential cryptanalysis (see [7]). By [9, Fact 3], a vectorial
Boolean function differentially δ-uniform satisfies
|Im(fˆu)| ≥
2m
δ
.
Definition 2.4. Let 1 ≤ r < m and f(0) = 0, we say that f is strongly r-anti-
invariant if, for any two subspaces U and W of (F2)
m such that f(U) = W , then
either dim(U) = dim(W ) < m− r or U = W = (F2)m.
2.2. Partition-based trapdoors. We recall that a permutation group G acting
on V is called primitive if it has no nontrivial G-invariant partition of V . That is,
there no exists a partition A of V different from the trivial partitions {{v} | v ∈ V },
{V }, such that Ag ∈ A for all A ∈ A and g ∈ G. On the other hand, if a nontrivial
G-invariant partition exists, the group is called imprimitive.
As said before a property of Γ∞ considered undesirable is the imprimitivity.
Paterson [17] showed that if this group is imprimitive, then it is possible to embed
a trapdoor in the cipher.
Another trapdoor, based on the idea of the imprimitive action, is the Partition-
based trapdoor, introduced in a recent work [5]. In this work the authors give some
conditions to construct a translation-based cipher which associates a partition of
the plaintext space to another partition of the ciphertext space.
We report some of the definitions and results presented in [5].
Definition 2.5. Let ρ be a permutation of V and A,B be two partitions of V . Let
Aρ denote the set {Aρ | A ∈ A}. We say that ρ maps A to B if Aρ = B. Moreover,
let G be a permutation group we say that G maps A to B if for all ρ ∈ G, ρ maps
A to B.
Remark 1. Note that a permutation group G is imprimitive if there exists a non-
trivial partition A such that for all ρ ∈ G Aρ = A.
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Definition 2.6. A partition A of V is said linear if there exists U a subspace of V
such that
A = {U + v | v ∈ V }.
We denote with L(U) such a partition.
The following result, introduced by Harpes in [14], characterizes the possible
partitions A and B such that T (V ) maps A to B.
Proposition 1. Let A and B be two partitions of V = (F2)d. Then the permutation
group T (V ) maps A to B if and only if A = B and A is a linear partition.
Focusing on the mixing-layer we have.
Proposition 2 ([5]). Let λ be a linear permutation of V , i.e. λ ∈ GL(V ), and let
U be a subspace of V . Then L(U)λ = L(Uλ).
We report now the main theorem of [5]. In [5] the following result is reported
for a SPN cipher with the same S-box and mixing-layer for each round, but can be
extended to any translation based cipher with independent round keys.
Theorem 2.7. Let C be a translation based cipher on V . Suppose that there exist A
and B non-trivial partitions such that for all ℓ-tuples of round-keys k = (k1, ..., kℓ)
the encryption function τk maps A to B. Define A1 = A and for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ
Ai+1 = Aiτi, where τi = γiλi is the i-th round function without the round key
translation. Then
• Aℓ+1 = B
• for any 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ+ 1 Ai is a linear partition.
3. Avoiding the partition-based trapdoor. In this section we will give suffi-
cient conditions on the components of a tb cipher to guarantee that such a trapdoor
cannot be implemented.
Lemma 3.1. Let γ be a permutation on V such that 0γ = 0 and suppose that γ
maps L(U) to L(W ) then for all u ∈ U
Im(γˆu) ⊆W.
Proof. The fact that γ maps L(U) to L(W ) and 0γ = 0 imply that Uγ = W .
Moreover for all v ∈ V we have that vγ ∈ (U + v)γ. Then (U + v)γ = W + vγ. This
implies that
(u+ v)γ + vγ ∈ W
for all v ∈ V and u ∈ U .
From Lemma 3.1 we have the following.
Proposition 3. Let γ be a brick-layer transformation, i.e. γ = (γ1, ..., γb) with
γi ∈ Sym(Vi) for all i. Suppose that for all i γi is
1. differentially 2r-uniform, with r < m,
2. strongly (r − 1)-anti-invariant
Let L(U) and L(W ) be non-trivial linear partitions of V , then γ maps L(U) to
L(W ) if and only if U and W are walls, in particular U = W .
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Proof. Suppose that γ maps L(U) to L(W ) and that U is not a wall. Then let
I = {i | πi(U) 6= 0}. There exists i ∈ I such that U ∩ Vi 6= Vi because U is not a
wall. Moreover U ∩ Vi 6= {0}. Indeed, let u ∈ U , with ui 6= 0. For all v ∈ V such
that vj = 0 for all j 6= i we have that
(u+ vi)γ + viγ ∈W
from Lemma 3.1. Moreover uγ ∈ W . It follows that uγ + (u + vi)γ + viγ ∈ W .
The vector uγ + (u + vi)γ + viγ has all nonzero components but for the one in Vi,
which is uiγi + (ui + vi)γi + viγi ∈ W ∩ Vi. As γ is a brick layer transformation, if
U ∩ Vi = {0}, then W ∩ Vi = {0}. So, if the vector uiγi + (ui + vi)γi + viγi is zero
for all vi ∈ Vi, then Im(γˆi) = {uiγi}, of size 1. This contradicts the first condition
on the γi’s.
Thus U ∩ Vi is a proper subspace of Vi and (U ∩ Vi)γ = W ∩ Vi is also a proper
subspace of Vi. Since Im(γˆu) ⊆ W for all u ∈ U , we have Im(γˆiu) ⊆ W ∩ Vi for
all u ∈ U ∩ Vi. Thus, |Im(γˆiu)| for any non-zero u is greater or equal to 2
m−r and,
being γi a permutation, the set Im(γˆiu) does not contain the zero vector, which
implies dim(W ∩Vi) ≥ m− r+1. This contradicts the second condition on the γi’s.
Then, U is a wall and, since γ is a parallel map, we have U =W .
Vice versa, consider any wall U , as γ is a parallel map, it is easy to check that γ
maps {U + v | v ∈ V } in itself.
The following definition was introduced in [2].
Definition 3.2. Let λ ∈ GL(V ). λ is said to be a strongly proper mixing-layer if
it does not map a proper wall in an other wall.
We define a strongly-proper round of a tb cipher as a proper round, where the
mixing-layer is also strongly proper.
Theorem 3.3. Let a round h < ℓ be a strongly proper round and suppose that
the brick-layer transformations of round h and round h + 1, γh and γh+1, satisfy
Condition 1) and 2) of Proposition 3. Then, there do not exist A and B non-trivial
partitions such that for all ℓ-tuples of round keys the encryption functions map A
to B.
Proof. Suppose that the partition-based trapdoor is applicable for all ℓ-tuples of
round keys. From Theorem 2.7 we have that there exist two linear partitions L(U)
and L(W ) such that γhλh maps L(U) to L(W ). Thus γh maps L(U) to L(W (λh)−1).
From Proposition 3 we have that U is a wall and the same for W (λh)
−1. Now being
λh strongly-proper we have that W is not a wall. Then from Theorem 2.7 we have
that γh+1 maps L(W ) to another linear partition, but it is not possible since W is
not a wall and this contradicts Proposition 3.
The result of Theorem 3.3 can be generalized, using a weaker condition on the
mixing-layers composing the round functions. Consider, for example, the mixing-
layer of AES. This is not strongly-proper, as there exists a wall which is sent in
another wall. Indeed, the state of AES can be represented as a 4×4 matrix of bytes
(Table 1). That is, V = V1 ⊕ ...⊕ V16, where Vi is isomorphic to (F2)8.
The mixing-layer of AES is composed by two linear functions ShiftRow (SR) and
MixColumn (MC). The ShiftRows transformation acts in a way such that a wall is
sent in an other wall, and in particular V1⊕V6⊕V11⊕V16 is sent in V1⊕V5⊕V9⊕V13.
Now, as MixColumn combines the blocks of a same column of the state, we have
that V1 ⊕ V5 ⊕ V9 ⊕ V13 (which is the first column of the state) is sent in itself
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V1 V2 V3 V4
V5 V6 V7 V8
V9 V10 V11 V12
V13 V14 V15 V16
Table 1. AES state
V1 V2 V3 V4
V5 V6 V7 V8
V9 V10 V11 V12
V13 V14 V15 V16
SR
7→
V1 V2 V3 V4
V5 V6 V7 V8
V9 V10 V11 V12
V13 V14 V15 V16
MC
7→
V1 V2 V3 V4
V5 V6 V7 V8
V9 V10 V11 V12
V13 V14 V15 V16
Table 2. AES wall
(Table 2). However, the previous attack cannot be applied to AES as the mixing
layer satisfies the following property.
Definition 3.4. Let λ1, ..., λℓ be the mixing-layers used in a tb cipher with ℓ rounds.
We say that the ordered family Λ = (λ1, ..., λℓ) is strongly proper if for all possible
non-trivial wall W there exists j < ℓ such that Wλ1 · ... · λj is not a wall.
Corollary 1. Let C be a tb cipher with Λ = (λ1, ..., λℓ) strongly proper and for
each round h the parallel map γh satisfies the conditions of Proposition 3. Then the
partition-based trapdoor is not applicable.
Proof. Suppose that the partition-based trapdoor is applicable. From Theorem 2.7
we have that each round functions (without the translation with respect to the
round key) τh = γhλh maps a linear partition L(Uh) into L(Uh+1). From Lemma
3.1 the space Uh is a wall for all 1 ≤ h ≤ ℓ. Then, being γh a parallel map and
0γh = 0 we have
Uh+1 = Uhλh = U1λ1 · ... · λh
for all h.
Since Λ is strongly proper, there exists j < ℓ such that U1λ1 · ... ·λj is not a wall,
which contradicts the fact that Uh is a wall for all 1 ≤ h ≤ ℓ.
It may seem that the previous corollary requires strong conditions on the mixing
layers and on the S-boxes. We show that the requirement on the mixing layers is
necessary.
Proposition 4. Let C be a tb cipher, with Λ = (λ1, ..., λℓ) not strongly proper.
Then the partition trapdoor is applicable.
Proof. Because Λ = (λ1, ..., λℓ) is not strongly propers, then there existsW a proper
wall such that Wλ1 · ... · λj is a wall for all 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ. Now being the γh a parallel
map we have that for all wall W ′ and v ∈ V
(W ′ + v)γh = W
′ + vγh,
which concludes the proof.
4. Security proof for a cipher with independent round-keys. In this section
we will discuss the fact that studying the group Γ∞ to understand the security of
a block cipher C could not be enough.
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We report an example of block cipher C whose components satisfy the cryp-
tographic properties given in [2] sufficient to thwart the trapdoor introduced by
Paterson [17], but that is weak with respect to the partition-based trapdoor.
Let V = (F2)
mb, Vi = (F2)
m, with m, b ≥ 1 and γi ∈ Sym(Vi) be the inverse
permutation for all 0 ≤ i ≤ b − 1, i,e. γi : x 7→ x2
m
−2 (using the representation as
univariate polynomial). Consider the following mixing-layer
λ =


0 Im×m 0 ... 0
0 0 Im×m ... 0
...
...
0 ... Im×m
Im×m ... 0


where Im×m is the identity matrix of size m ×m. It is easy to check that λ is a
proper mixing-layer but not strongly proper.
Consider now the linear partitions L(V1), ...,L(Vb), and suppose to have ℓ rounds
where we use λ and γ in each one. From [2, Theorem 3.1] Γ∞(C) is primitive, but
each encryption function maps L(Vi) to L(Vσℓ(i)), where σ is the permutation of
{1, ..., b} such that σ : i 7→ i+ 1 for all i < b and σ : b 7→ 1.
Obviously, the mixing-layer λ is not interesting from a cryptographic point of view.
We use this only as an example to show that if Γ∞(C) is primitive this does not
guarantee security on C. Moreover, if we use a number ℓ of rounds such that L(Vi) =
L(Vσℓ(i)) for some i, then Γ∞(C) is primitive and the group Γ(C) is imprimitive.
As we pointed out in Section 2, it would be interesting to study the group Γ(C).
However, this group depends, strongly, on the key-schedule used to create the round-
keys. For this reason, usually, we study the properties of the group Γ∞(C) (see for
instance [4, 13, 19, 20, 21]). But, as we showed above, we could have that even if the
group Γ∞(C) is considered secure, the group Γ(C) may be not secure with respect
to the trapdoors considered here. Then, we think that it is better to consider, and
study, the group of a cipher C obtained using independent round-keys, that is,
Γind(C) = 〈τK | K ∈ V
ℓ〉,
where, lettingK = (k1, . . . , kℓ), τK is the encryption function obtained using kh ∈ V
as round-key at round h. Clearly, Γind(C) is such that
Γ(C) ⊆ Γind(C) ⊆ Γ∞(C).
We can summarize the results obtained in this work for Γind(C) in the following:
Theorem 4.1. Let C be a tb cipher. Suppose that one of the following properties
is satisfied:
1. there exists a round h which is a strongly proper round and the brick-layer
transformations γh, γh+1 satisfy Condition 1) and 2) of Proposition 3,
or
2. the family Λ = (λ1, ..., λℓ) is strongly proper and for each round h the parallel
map γh satisfies Condition 1) and 2) of Proposition 3.
Then the partition-based trapdoor is not applicable. Moreover, Γind(C) is primitive.
Proof. From Theorem 3.3 (or Corollary 1) we have that there do not exist two
partitions A and B such that Aτk = B for all τk ∈ Γind(C). Moreover, the group
Γind(C) is imprimitive if and only if there exists a partition such that Aτk = A for
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all τk ∈ Γind(C) (see Remark 1), which is a particular case where the partition-based
trapdoor is applicable.
5. Conclusions and final remarks. An interesting open problem proposed by
Paterson [17] was to investigate if it is possible to construct a block cipher such
that the group Γ∞ is primitive, but the resulting cipher is weak with respect to
the imprimitive trapdoor. As we pointed out in Section 4, it may happen that the
cipher is vulnerable even if the group generated by the round functions results to be
primitive. For this reason, here, we studied the group Γind generated by the cipher
with independent round keys. We think that studying algebraic properties for this
group could be more appropriate to investigate security properties of a cipher. In
particular, we gave sufficient conditions on the components of a cipher C, so that
the partition trapdoor given in [5] cannot be applied to the encryption functions
generating Γind(C). As a consequence, we obtained also the primitivity for the
group Γind(C).
Note that this type of trapdoor can be easily avoided. Indeed, as noted in
[2], for an invertible vectorial Boolean function to be strongly 1-anti-invariant is
equivalent to have no linear components (i.e. the nonlinearity is greater than 0).
Such a property is usually requested by the S-boxes of a cipher to avoid linear
cryptanalysis [16]. Moreover, to achieve a good diffusion we need that the mixing
layer satisfies the condition given in Definition 3.4. Therefore, from Theorem 4.1,
sufficient conditions to thwart the partition trapdoor are:
• S-boxes with differential 4-uniformity and nonlinearity different from 0.
• strongly proper mixing layers (or that satisfy the condition in Definition 3.4).
For well-know ciphers like AES, PRESENT and SERPENT we have that these two
characteristics are satisfied.
In the work [6], the authors give a method to construct the S-boxes of a block-
cipher in order to let be possible the partition trapdoor (see Section 3 in [6]). Using
their method they construct a cipher, with S-boxes defined over F102 , which is weak
with respect to their trapdoor. It is possible to check that such a cipher cannot be
attacked using the classical linear and differential cryptanalysis. However, as the
same author stated, the structure of their linear and differential tables is likely to
betray the existence of a backdoor and can be used to find it. For this reason they
create an other attack perturbing the S-boxes of the cipher, in order to strengthen
it. These new S-boxes “behave” similarly to their secret counterparts, that means
the output of a perturbed S-box is with high probability equals to the output of the
corresponding non-perturbed S-box.
The mixing layer used in this block cipher is similar to the AES mixing layer,
in particular we can check that the condition in Definition 3.4 is satisfied. The
perturbed S-boxes are at most differentially 40-uniform (and thus 25-uniform). So,
if we would analize if the properties of Theorem 4.1 are satisfied we need to check if
it is strongly 4-anti-invariant. This computation could be possible, but quite long.
So we could verify the resistance of the block cipher to the partition trapdoor in an
other way.
In Theorem 4.1 we use the differential uniformity of the S-boxes to say that
Im(γˆu) is greaten than 2
n/2r. So, we could generalize the first condition in Propo-
sition 3 as follow.
(1’) Im(γˆu) > 2
n−r for all nonzero u ∈ Fn2 .
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Note that this condition is pretty similar to the weak differential uniformity intro-
duced in [10] and also studied in [3].
Using this fact, we have, for the case of the perturbed S-boxes of the cipher, that
Im(γˆu) > 2
6. So, we can check if the the S-boxes are strongly 3-anti-invariant. This
check is much easier, indeed we need to check if vector subspaces of dimension at
least 7 are mapped onto an other vector subspace. Using the software MAGMA
it is possible, now, to check that all the S-boxes of the cipher are strongly 3-anti-
invariant. Which implies that the cipher is secure with respect to the trapdoor.
Then, using only the analysis reported in this work, we cannot detect the backdoor
introduced in [6]. However the high differential uniformity of the S-boxes could lead
to some suspect, suggesting the existence of a backdoor.
So it is a very interesting open problem to understand which cryptographic prop-
erties can be useful to avoid also the attack with perturbed S-boxes.
Another requested property for a cipher is that the group generated by the en-
cryption functions is not “small” (see for instance [15]). Usually, this property is
investigated for the group of the round functions ([4, 13, 19]). With an ad hoc
proof, in [21] and [20] Wernsdorf proved respectively that Γ∞(AES) = Alt(V ) and
Γ∞(SERPENT ) = Alt(V ), where Alt(V ) is the alternating group. In [2, 10] are
given conditions for tb ciphers so that Γ∞(C) is the symmetric (alternating) group.
In the case of ciphers like AES and PRESENT, where the same S-box and mixing
layer are used in each round, we have that Γind(C) is normal in Γ∞(C) (see for
instance [4, Lemma 3.4]), so if Γ∞(C) is the symmetric (alternating) group we have
Γind(C) = Γ∞(C). However, this is no more the case of ciphers like, e.g., SERPENT,
where the used S-box depends on the round. Then, it may happen that the group of
the round functions generates the symmetric (alternating) group, while the group
generated by the encryption functions is not.
Moreover, the only condition that Γ∞(C) is the symmetric (alternating) group
does not guarantee that the cipher is secure with respect the trapdoor studied in
this work. Indeed, if we consider the example of the cipher given in Section 4,
adding at the last round a strongly-proper mixing layer we will obtain that Γ∞(C)
is the alternating group. This is implied by Theorem 4.7 in [2]. However, as in
Section 4, such a cipher can be broken using the partition based trapdoor. Another
example of a weak cipher having Γ∞(C) = Sym(V ) is given in [18].
Another interesting future research could be investigating assumptions on the
components of a cipher C which can guarantee that the group Γind(C) is the sym-
metric (alternating) group.
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